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INTRODUCTION
In late November 2004, various websites, including AppleInsider and
PowerPage, displayed specific information about a new product that Apple
Computer, Inc. was developing.' Apple had yet to officially announce the
product, a FireWire audio interface (codenamed "Asteroid" or "Q7") that
would allow users to directly record audio onto their computers from attached
musical instruments or other audio devices.2 In response to the widespread
dissemination of its confidential information over these websites' blogs, Apple
filed suit in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County, California, alleging that
"unnamed individuals or entities had leaked specific, trade secret information"
to the websites.3 Believing that the timing and publicity of product launches is
valuable, Apple sought indeterminate damages from the defendant(s) and an
injunction restraining them from misappropriating trade secret information
about future products.4
To identify the proper defendant(s), Apple concurrently filed an application
for expedited discovery, which the Superior Court quickly granted.5 Apple thus
sought leave to subpoena AppleInsider, PowerPage, ThinkSecret,6 and Nfox,
I Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2008. B.A., Yale College, 2005. The author wishes to thank Dan
Korobkin, Intisar Rabb, Brian Rodkey, Alex Potapov, and Robert Dunne for their insightful comments
and suggestions, as well as Geneva McDaniel for her skillful editing.
1. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 1-04-CV-032178, 2005 WL 578641, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Mar. 11, 2005); see, e.g., Kasper Jade, Apple Developing FireWire Audio Interface for GarageBand,
APPLEINSIDER, Nov. 23, 2004, http://www.appleinsider.com/article.php?id=756.
2. Apple Computer, 2005 WL 578641, at *1.
3. Id.
4. Complaint at 1, 5-6, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. t-04-CV-032178, (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec
13, 2004).
5. Apple Computer, 2005 WL 578641, at *2; Order Granting Ex Parte Application for Discovery
and Issuance of Commissions at * 1, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 1-04-CV-032178, (Cal. Super.
Ct. Dec. 14, 2004).
6. Additionally, Apple filed a separate lawsuit against ThinkSecret alleging that postings about
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PowerPage's email service provider, to identify their source(s).7 In response,
the authors of PowerPage and AppleInsider moved for a protective order to
block all subpoenas; Nfox did not object to its subpoena.8 The movants'
argument contained three parts: 1) in obtaining the information about Apple's
product, they were acting as "journalists"; 2) as "journalists," they were able to
withhold their confidential sources under the First Amendment; and 3) as
"journalists," they were able to protect the confidentiality of their sources under
California's "shield law." 9 Apple countered that trade secret law mandates that
the bloggers reveal their source(s).10 In addition, Apple asserted that bloggers
are not journalists. 1
On March 11, 2005, Judge James Kleinberg sidestepped the larger issue of
whether bloggers are entitled to the protections of journalists, ruling only that
the email provider Nfox, an entity that did not claim journalistic privilege, must
divulge its information. 12 While he did not reach a decision on the subpoenas
targeting AppleInsider, PowerPage, and ThinkSecret, in dicta Judge Kleinberg
signaled that he does not approve of third parties, including journalists, posting
illegally leaked trade secrets. 
13
In response to the ruling, the non-party journalists have filed a petition for a
writ staying discovery with the California Court of Appeal (Sixth District),
which is pending as O'Grady v. Superior Court.14 In anticipation of the
appellate court's review of Judge Kleinberg's decision, many concerned
organizations have filed amicus briefs with detailed analyses of First
Amendment and shield law cases, in an attempt to demonstrate that the First
Amendment's free speech guarantees should not be read as discriminating
between bloggers and print journalists and that bloggers should be able to
conceal their sources.15 Numerous commentators echo these claims.
16
other future products amounted to trade secret violations. That suit is pending in California Superior
Court as Apple v. DePlume, No. 1-05-CV-033341 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 4, 2005).
7. Supplement to Ex Parte Application for an Order for Issuance of Commission and Granting
Leave to Serve Subpoenas and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Same at 2-7, Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 1-04-CV-032178, (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2004)
8. Apple Computer, 2005 WL 578641, at *3.
9. Notice of and Motion by Nonparty Journalists for Protective Order and Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support Thereof at *2, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 1-04-CV-032178, (Cal.
Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2005).
10. Plaintiff Apple Computer, Inc.'s Opposition to Motion for Protective Order by Monish Bhatia,
Kasper Jade and Jason D. O'Grady at 4-8, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 1-04-CV-032178, (Cal.
Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2005).
II. Id. at * 10-11 (stating that movants are not "enumerated newspersons").
12. Apple Computer, 2005 WL 578641, at *8.
13. Id.
14. Petitioners and Non-Party Journalists Jason O'Grady, Monish Bhatia, and Kasper Jade's
Petition for a Writ of Mandate and/or Prohibition, O'Grady v. Superior Court, No. H028579 (Cal. Ct.
App. filed Mar. 22, 2005).
15. Twenty-five organizations and seventeen individuals signed on to four amicus briefs focusing
on the rights of non-party bloggers to conceal their sources. Amicus Brief of Online Journalists and
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Continued litigation of this matter appears likely to produce the first judicial
determination of whether bloggers have First Amendment rights to withhold
confidential sources, and, if so, how to weigh trade secret law against such
rights. These issues are almost certain to reemerge in various contexts and
jurisdictions as online media further proliferate.
This Comment seeks to develop a framework for resolving the competing
interests at stake when bloggers' claims of journalistic privilege clash with
firms' claims of trade secret protection. In Part I, a brief legal and functional
comparison of bloggers to traditional journalists suggests that bloggers deserve
First Amendment and shield law protections as strong as those enjoyed by other
news sources. Part II highlights the significance of the protections to which
journalists are entitled. Part III disapproves of the current case-by-case
approach to balancing trade secrets against journalistic protections, which
requires courts to make a yes-or-no determination that disclosed information
either constitutes a "genuine trade secret" or does not reach the level of "trade
secret" at all. Part IV suggests a new approach: Trade secrets should be
designated on a continuum based on whether the information is unique and
economically valuable, and only the most important trade secrets should trump
bloggers' journalistic privileges. Such a continuum will ensure that valuable
information is protected, but also that the public's interest in a free press is not
jeopardized. Part V concludes by applying this test to Apple Computer.
I. ARE BLOGGERS JOURNALISTS?
No courts or legislatures have yet addressed whether bloggers are entitled
to the same constitutional, statutory and common law protections provided to
traditional journalists. Yet the issue has received much public attention. From
both a functional and a legal perspective, many believe that little distinguishes
Internet journalists from traditional journalists because, as one commentator
has articulated, each "hunts down suppressed, overlooked or misunderstood
information of public interest ... and presents or explains it to an audience....
The medium of publication is irrelevant."
' 17
Organizations, O'Grady v. Apple Computers, Inc. No. 1-04-CV-032178 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 18,
2005); Amicus Brief of the U.S. Internet Industry Association and NetCoalition, O'Grady v. Apple
Computers, Inc., No. 1-04-CV-032178 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 18, 2005); Amicus Brief of Bear Flag
League, O'Grady v. Apple Computers, Inc. No. 1-04-CV-032178 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 14, 2005);
Amicus Brief of the Reporters Committee for Freedom on the Press, et al., O'Grady v. Apple
Computers, Inc. No. 1-04-CV-032178 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 7, 2005).
16. See, e.g., Randy Dotinga, Are Bloggers Journalists? Do They Deserve Press Protections?
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 2, 2005, at USA3; Rachel Konrad, News Organizations Back Online
Journalists in Apple Trade Secret Case, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Utah), Apr. 12, 2005, at E5.
17. Michael Hiltzik, As Apple Suit Shows, "Journalism" is Broad, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2005 at
Cl; see also William E. Lee, The Priestly Class: Reflections on a Journalist's Privilege, 23 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 635, 635 (2006) ("[Plrominent First Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams conceded
that web bloggers should have a constitutional privilege to refuse to disclose their confidential sources,
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The U.S. Supreme Court's past reasoning can be read as signaling openness
to this argument. The Court has repeatedly held that the definition of
"journalist" includes not only those reporters who work for large and respected
news organizations, but also individuals who write for alternative media. As
early as 1935, in Lovell v. City of Griffin, 18 the Court held:
[T]he liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It
necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been historic
weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in
our own history abundantly attest. The press in its historic connotation comprehends
every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.
19
In 1972, the Court held in Branzburg v. Hayes20 that "liberty of the press is
the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph
just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest
photocomposition methods."21 Lovell and Branzburg clearly support privileges
for at least some less traditional forms of media.
Further strengthening bloggers' claims for journalistic privileges, "the
lonely pamphleteer" is becoming less useful as an analog for bloggers, many of
whom are wielding important influence over public opinion. For example,
Power Line was largely responsible for debunking the memos in the CBS
newsroom that purportedly forged information about President George W.
Bush's National Guard service. 22 Another blog, the Talking Points Memo is
described as "a must-read among the Democratic elite." 23 Talking Points Memo
boasts over 100,000 readers per day, larger than the circulation of all but about
seventy-five of the newspapers in the United States.
24
As a result of their influence, bloggers are beginning to receive treatment
similar to that accorded to traditional journalists. In March 2005, Garrett Graff,
who writes the fishbowlDC blog on the Washington press, became the first
blogger to be granted White House press credentials. The White House
Correspondents Association, entirely composed of traditional journalists,
supported Graff s effort. 25 Bloggers have also "secured seats on campaign
planes, at political conventions and in presidential debates, and have become a
just like journalists at major news outlets."); Eugene Volokh, You Can Blog, But You Can't Hide, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at A39 ("The rules should be the same for old media and new, professional and
amateur. Any journalist's privilege should extend to every journalist.").
18. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
19. Id. at 452.
20. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
21. Id. at 704.
22. Lev Grossman, Blogs Have Their Day: How Three Amateur Journalists Dethroned an Icon and
Turned the Mainstream Media Upside Down, All Without Quitting Their Day Jobs, TIME, Dec. 19,
2004, at 109.
23. Dotinga, supra note 16.
24. Id.
25. Katharine Q. Seelye, White House Approves Pass for Blogger, N.Y. TIMES, March 7, 2005, at
C5.
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driving force in news events themselves."
26
Despite Lovell, Branzburg, and the increased influence of bloggers, some
critics of blogging contend that this medium is fundamentally different from
traditional journalism because bloggers tend not to be as accountable to editors
and fact checkers as are traditional journalists.27 However, there is a powerful
check keeping bloggers accountable-the public. Readers point out mistakes
very quickly, and, with digital feedback and the ability to update web pages
instantly, corrections can be made to blogs much more quickly than they can be
made in print publications. Additionally, corrections in blogs can be inserted
directly into the text, while newspapers and magazines issue corrections in
small print the next day or (sometimes much) later.
Of course, just as ill-intentioned and irresponsible journalists appear in print
and on radio and television, there are also reporters on the web who do not
intend to benefit the public. If critics of blogging are concerned about granting
journalistic privileges to ill-intentioned bloggers, courts, like the California
Supreme Court, can differentiate journalists who deserve a journalistic
privilege from those who do not. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has adopted an
intent-based functional test to draw this very distinction. Shoen v. Shoen28 was
a case that sought to define who can receive the protections of journalists'
qualified First Amendment privilege. In Shoen, an investigative reporter sought
to quash a subpoena demanding that he produce documents relating to
interviews he conducted while writing a book detailing a long and bitter family
feud over control of a highly successful business. 29 In deciding whether the
author had to comply with the subpoena, the Ninth Circuit held that the
journalist's privilege was not limited to traditional forms of media, 30 and that
an individual is entitled to the privilege if he or she "had the intent to use
materials-sought, gathered, or received-to disseminate information to the
public and . . . such intent existed at the inception of the newsgathering
process." 3' Applying the test, the court found that the author was entitled to the
journalistic privilege and therefore did not have to comply with the subpoena.
California state courts could easily adopt this test, or devise another test like it,
to determine which bloggers qualify as real journalists.
As this Part demonstrates, there is significant overlap between bloggers and
26. Id.
27. Anne Broache, Senators: Bloggers May Not Be True Journalists, CNETNEWS.COM, Oct. 19,
2005, http://news.com.com/Senators+Bloggers+may+not+be+true+joumalists/2100-1047_3-
5902539.html.
28. 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993).
29. Id. at 1290-91.
30. Id. at 1293 ("[W]e see no principled basis for denying the protection of the journalist's privilege
to investigative book authors while granting it to more traditional print and broadcast journalists. What
makes journalism journalism is not its format but its content.").
31. Id. (citing von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987)).
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journalists. Bloggers are influential, accountable, and usually have the same
intentions as journalists. The policy concerns that afford journalists First
Amendment privileges are not affected by shifting the medium to the Internet;
there is no compelling reason to think differently about bloggers' needs for
journalistic protections. Because the First Amendment protects expression on
the Internet no less than it protects spoken or printed expression,32 bloggers
who satisfy Shoen or a similar test should receive the same protection as
journalists whose work product is disseminated by other media. At least some
bloggers are journalists and should be treated as such.
II. ASSUMING AT LEAST SOME BLOGGERS ARE "JOURNALISTS,"
TO WHAT PROTECTIONS ARE THEY ENTITLED?
Ordinary citizens who do not respond to a subpoena in a timely fashion and
who do not raise a valid defense33 risk being held in contempt of court.34
However, in the interest of protecting confidential sources, most lower courts
have interpreted Branzburg v. Hayes as providing a qualified First Amendment
privilege for journalists to refuse to comply with subpoenas. 35 This privilege is
described as "qualified" because the journalist's claim of privilege does not
always override a competing compelling interest, such as the traditional
importance of grand juries in criminal investigations. 36 In his concurrence in
32. See, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
33. Defenses in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include those where the subpoena fails to
allow reasonable time for compliance, requires a person who is not a party or an officer of a party to
travel to a place more than 100 miles from the place where the person resides, requires disclosure of
protected matter, or subjects a person to undue burden. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A). California has
recognized similar defenses. In California, a subpoena to a non-party must generally specify a location
within seventy-five miles of the witness's residence. The state recognizes privileges, like the attorney-
client privilege. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 954-955 (Deering 2006). Subpoenas cannot impose an undue
burden in California, so individuals will not be required to undertake expensive and time-consuming
efforts for discovery unless the evidence sought is important to the case, and there is no less burdensome
alternative. Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. App. 4th 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
34. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1209(d) (Deering 2006).
35. The qualified privilege resulting from the Branzburg decision stems from the fact that Justice
Powell, in his concurrence, joined four dissenters to recognize a qualified privilege for journalists.
Reasoning that Justice Powell's position represents the "minimum common denominator" of the
Branzburg majority (Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 510 (E.D. Va. 1976)), most lower
courts have combined Justice Stewart's dissent and Justice Powell's concurrence to reinterpret the
Branzburg decision as creating a qualified privilege. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709-10, 725-52. For
examples of how lower courts have adopted this position, see Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) ("[Tlhe Court indicated that a qualified privilege would be available in some circumstances
even where a reporter is called before a grand jury to testify. Moreover, Justice Powell, who cast the
deciding vote in Branzburg, wrote a concurring opinion in which he stated that courts can determine
whether a privilege applies." (internal citations omitted)) and Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 785 (2d
Cir. 1972) ("If, as Mr. Justice Powell noted ... instances will arise in which First Amendment values
outweigh the duty of a journalist to testify even in the context of a criminal investigation, surely in civil
cases, courts must recognize that the public interest in a non-disclosure of journalists' confidential news
sources will often be weightier than the private interest in compelled disclosure.").
36. Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 711 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707); see also In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting First Amendment protection for
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Branzburg, Justice Powell first articulated the idea that the best way to decide
which right prevails is on a case-by-case basis.37 The case-by-case approach is
now overwhelmingly recognized as correct.
38
In Mitchell v. Superior Court,39 the California Supreme Court adopted a
qualified journalistic privilege doctrine from Branzburg because "journalists
frequently depend on informants to gather news, and confidentiality is often
essential to establishing a relationship with an informant. ' 4° The Mitchell court
qualified this privilege because there are times when full disclosure of relevant
evidence is warranted, but it placed heavy emphasis on the public's right toS 41
non-disclosure. Mitchell also followed the case-by-case approach to decision-
making.42
Finally, California, like many other states, 4 3 has a state shield law, which
usually grants persons connected with news organizations immunity from being
held in contempt "for refusing to disclose the source of any information
procured while so connected or employed for [public dissemination] . . .,4
Contempt is generally the only effective remedy against nonparty witnesses
like the bloggers in Apple Computer,45 so insofar as the California statutes
shield nonparty witnesses from contempt, they grant such witnesses virtually
absolute protection against compelled disclosure.46 Thus, protections for
journalists are strong, and they are particularly strong for journalists who are
nonparty witnesses in California.
"journalists' confidential sources in the context of a grand jury investigation").
37. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[T]he courts will be available to
newsmen under circumstances where legitimate First Amendment interests require protection.").
38. See United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 969 (3d Cir. 1998); Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 712; Bruno &
Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595-96 (1st Cir. 1980); Riley v. City of Chester,
612 F.2d 708, 715-16 (3d. Cir. 1979); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Baker, 470
F.2d at 784; Hutira v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118-19 (D.D.C. 2002); Democratic
Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1397-98 (D.D.C. 1973).
39. 690 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1984).
40. Id. at 628 (quoting Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 711).
41. "[C]ourts must recognize that the public interest in a non-disclosure ofjournalists' confidential
news sources will often be weightier than the private interest in compelled disclosure." Id. at 629-30,
quoting Baker, 470 F.2d at 784-85 (2d Cir. 1972)).
42. Id. at 631-35.
43. Today, thirty-one states plus Washington, D.C., have shield laws on the books. Maria Newman,
Administration Calls Media Shield Bill "Bad Public Policy," N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/20/politics/20cnd-shield.html.
44. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b) (amended 1980).
45. Judge Kleinberg suggested that the California shield law does not protect the bloggers in Apple
from being held in contempt, so balancing trade secrets against First Amendment and common law
journalistic privileges is even more important in this case. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 1-04-CV-
03178, 2005 WL 578641, at * 7 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar 11, 2005) (stating that based on the shield law "and
the facts presented, it is far from clear that Mr. O'Grady qualifies for relief from the subpoena on the
grounds advanced").
46. SCI-Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 4th 654, 663-64 (1997). A party to civil
litigation who disobeys an order to disclose evidence, however, "may be subject to a variety of other
sanctions, including the entry of judgment against him." Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625, 628
(Cal. 1984).
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III. TRADE SECRET LAW: PAST DECISIONS RELATED TO THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AND RECENT TRENDS
While journalists enjoy strong protections, the question remains: How
strong are these protections relative to trade secret protection? Courts rarely are
asked to consider the First Amendment in relation to trade secret
misappropriation, but First Amendment claims are not unheard of.47 A few
such defenses have met with success.48 For example, in CBS Inc. v. Davis,49 a
South Dakota meat-packing company charged CBS with trade secret
misappropriation for allegedly revealing "confidential and proprietary practices
and processes" in showing videotape footage of its factory operations.50 The
Supreme Court stayed the state court's injunction as an unconstitutional prior
restraint on speech, allowing CBS to proceed with the broadcast.
51
Even in cases not involving prior restraint, the Court has found that the
First Amendment protects disclosure of some illegally obtained information. In
Bartnicki v. Vopper,5 2 an unknown person intercepted a telephone conversation
regarding a matter of public concern, and media representatives published the
contents of the conversation with full knowledge that the recording was
obtained by violating state and federal statutes.5 3 The Court held that disclosure
of illegally intercepted communication was protected by the First
54Amendment. Although Bartnicki did not involve the misappropriation or
disclosure of trade secrets, the Court's holding clearly contemplates First
Amendment protection for the media's dissemination of publicly valued
information, even where a third-party disseminator obtained the information
unlawfully.
47. See, e.g., ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 12.06 (2003) (noting that First
Amendment defenses are rare); Pamela Samuelson, Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the
First Amendment 2-5 (Mar. 20, 2003), http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/-pam/papers.html. Samuelson
advances several reasons why conflicts between trade secrets and the First Amendment have been so
rare: (I) Trade secrets often protect conduct, not speech, id. at 2, (2) Parties against disclosure of a trade
secret are typically trying to prevent disclosure to an individual or a firm rather than to the general
public, id., (3) "trade secrets are generally matters of private, not of public, concern," id. at 3, and (4)
"trade secret law is grounded in unfair competition, focusing on protecting legitimate expectations of
parties who have confidential or contractual relationships with one another and steering second comers
away from acquiring secrets by wrongful means," id. at 3-4.
48. See also Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that
injunction against disclosure by magazine of information leaked to it in violation of discovery order
violated the First Amendment); Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999); Oregon
ex rel. Sports Mgmt. News v. Nachtigal, 921 P.2d 1304 (Or. 1996). But see Garth v. Staktek Corp., 876
S.W.2d 545 (Tex. App. 1994) (upholding constitutionality of preliminary injunction in trade secret
case).
49. 510 U.S. 1315 (1994) (Blackmun, Circuit Justice).
50. Id. at 1316.
51. Id. at 1318.
52. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
53. Id. at 519.
54. Id. at 529-30 ("[I]t would be quite remarkable to hold that speech by a law-abiding possessor of
information can be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third party.").
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Not all cases weighing First Amendment claims against trade secrets
prevail, however. In a more recent case involving dissemination of trade secrets
on the Internet, the California Court of Appeal issued an injunction despite a
seemingly compelling First Amendment defense. DVD Copy Control
Association, Inc. v. Bunner55 was a suit brought against Andrew Bunner, a
computer programmer who operated a website and, in 1999, posted the code to
crack the encryption technology that scrambles data to prohibit illegal copying
of DVDs. The DVD Copy Control Association alleged that Bunner's posting of
the code enabled DVD enthusiasts among the public widespread access to
movies. 56 Bunner, in trying to establish a right to publish lawfully acquired
information that was initially misappropriated by a third party, cited
Bartnicki.57 In a unanimous decision, the California Supreme Court ruled in
favor of DVD Copy Control Association and ordered removal of the code.
Significantly, the court demonstrated it did not think the code violated the Free
Speech provisions of the United States and California constitutions.58
Bunner and Bartnicki set up a conundrum that leaves the question in Apple
Computer unresolved. Supporters of Apple's position can cite Bunner to claim
that trade secret law should prevail to "promote and reward innovation and
technological development." 59 Online journalists can still point to Bartnicki to
claim that illegally acquired communication is entitled to First Amendment
protections. Neither case speaks directly to the issue in Apple Computer;60 there
is no clear precedent for whether the journalist's privilege to keep sources
confidential is protected when trade secrets are revealed.
Without clear precedent, a variety of trends suggest that clashes between
the First Amendment and trade secret protections will not subside but will
become more common. First, as the global economy has become more
information-based, trade secrets more often are used to protect information
(increasingly with speech implications), as opposed to tangible inventions.
61
Second, while just a few decades ago trade secret law was considered a
relatively weak form of protection when balanced against competing interests,
62
55. 75 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2003).
56. Id. at 7.
57. Idat 15.
58. Id. at 19.
59. Id. at 12.
60. Apple is distinguishable from Bunner, which was not concerned with which interest should
prevail between a company's right to uncover who is revealing its trade secrets and a fully protected
journalist's right to disclose confidential sources. Bunner only addressed whether a web publisher is
liable for posting a trade secret.
61. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property
Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REv.
875, 884-88 (1999).
62. Samuelson, supra note 47, at 6-7 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476
(1974)).
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today courts like the Bunner court increasingly find that trade secrets provide
strong legal protections. 63 Perhaps related to the strengthening of trade secret
protections, there has developed "a heightened awareness of the benefits of
vigorous protection of intellectual property assets which seems to have induced
firms to claim a broader range of non-public information as trade secrets. ' 64 As
a result of these trends, it appears that trade secret developers are beginning to
use trade secrets to protect less important information. 65 The traditional
treatment of trade secrets, which does not distinguish between more valuable
trade secrets and those that are less so, does not pose a barrier to the above-
described trends because firms' high-priced legal counsel can frame many
things that the firm does as having the potential to derive an economic benefit
from being kept secret. Thus, firms can simply label much of what they do as a
"trade secret."
This practice is problematic in situations like the Apple Computer scenario
where trade secrets clash with the right of journalistic privilege, as any
journalist who uncovers information that a firm does not want the public to
know about faces a costly and burdensome legal threat. Further, in the absence
of clear precedent, such lawsuits are relatively likely to proceed to even more
costly trials because judges are able to balance competing interests in any way
they see fit and the parties involved are less likely to feel comfortable relying
on set outcomes. While ultimately judges may rule for either side depending on
how they balance the competing First Amendment and trade secret interests at
stake, the threat of costly litigation will jeopardize the public's right to fair and
accurate reporting through journalists' use of confidential sources. Courts must
find a new solution.
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO TRADE SECRET
LAW AND ITS ROLE IN A BALANCING TEST
Thus, with the number of conflicts pitting trade secrets against a journalist's
privilege likely to increase, courts might be tempted to reconcile such conflicts
by deciding that certain types of newsgatherers, such as bloggers, are not really
journalists at all, or at any rate are not journalists whose privilege should trump
the trade secret claim. Apple is advancing this very argument in California.
This argument should not prevail, however, because those bloggers who satisfy
63. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REv. 241, 243 (1998).
64. Samuelson, supra note 47, at 6 (citing Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude:
1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2187, 2233-40 (2000)).
65. See, e.g., Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2001); DTM
Research, L.L.C. v. AT & T Corp., 245 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2001); Phillip Morris Inc. v. Reilly, 113 F.
Supp. 2d 129 (D. Mass. 2000).
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Shoen's intent-based test are journalists, 66 and courts have no basis to prejudice
bloggers in deciding that traditional journalists' protections trump trade secret
law but that web journalists' protections do not. If courts cannot distinguish
between different types of newsgatherers, what facts can they look at to decide
which interest should prevail when balancing a journalist's privilege to keep
sources confidential against trade secrets?
The definition of "trade secret" appears to allow room for courts to
distinguish between these cases based on the information that each trade secret
seeks to protect. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure
or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy.
As is clear from this definition, all trade secrets share three elements: 1) the
information must be unknown to the public; 2) the holder of the information
must derive an economic benefit because the information is secret; and 3) the
holder must take reasonable efforts to keep the information secret. The third
element must remain as is: One should not recover damages or obtain an
injunction for publicized information if he or she did not try to protect the trade
secret in the first place. But courts can implement a two-part test in relation to
the first and second elements, respectively:
1) Is the trade secret unique (i.e., is the same or substantially similar
information not already on the market)?
2) In calculating the company's losses because of publication of the trade
secret, is the economic damage to the company minor or severe?
Based on these questions, courts can devise a continuum to distinguish the
"strong" trade secrets from the "weak" ones and determine when a trade secret
is important enough to trump a journalist's First Amendment privilege.
Despite potential gray areas, such a continuum seems well-suited to ensure
that truly valuable information remains protected, but also that the public's
interest in fair and accurate reporting is not jeopardized vis-A-vis courts
protecting "weak" trade secrets. Applying this test to the quintessential
"strong" trade secret, the formula for Coca-Cola, demonstrates this point. Coca-
Cola's formula is unique and the economic damage to the company would be
severe if the secret were published. Based on this test, if Coca-Cola's formula
were ever illegally revealed to a journalist, its trade secret protections would
trump any shield protections that might otherwise allow the publishing
66. See supra Part 1.
67. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). California has adopted the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426 (Deering 2006).
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journalist to conceal the source.
Critics may seek to attack this approach from an economic efficiency
standpoint by claiming that the test, in reducing the protections afforded by less
valuable trade secrets, will diminish creativity. 68 They may also claim that this
test would hinder firms' prospects of receiving returns on secret information by
mitigating the harmful effects of free riding, and that the test would permit
inefficient disclosure of less valuable secrets.
The proposed test, however, is efficient. It would have the strategic effect
of forcing firms to look introspectively at their information at an early juncture,
to question whether their information is unique, and to question whether
publication of the trade secret would result in severe economic loss to the firm.
If the information is unique and the economic loss would be severe, then the
firm would, for the first time, be able to rely on the fact that its information is
protected against First Amendment claims. Employees would refrain from
disclosing the trade secret to journalists because they would know that the
journalists cannot conceal the identities of the employee-sources. This scenario
eliminates inefficiencies associated with trade secret misappropriation, and it
reduces those transaction costs associated with litigation related to disclosure of
valuable trade secrets.
Of course, critics will be concerned primarily about the negative incentive
effects that this new standard might produce in diminishing trade secret
protection for less valuable information. This argument has some merit because
weakening protections for a class of not very valuable trade secrets might
diminish corporate incentives to create. The public also has an interest in
protecting confidential sources, though, because of the many positive
externalities that result from whistleblowers feeling assured that their identities
will be concealed if they speak with journalists. Admittedly, those individuals
who divulge trade secrets are unlikely to be true whistleblowers, and thus
protection of their identities should not override a firm's interest in protecting
valuable trade secrets. But, insofar as a public good results from protecting
journalists' privilege (because denying this right might compromise journalists'
ability to obtain information from true whistleblowers), courts should protect
the identities of sources who divulge less valuable information (because the
benefit that firms gain from protecting such information does not override
losses that result from diminishing this public good). Currently, positive
externalities related to protecting confidential sources are being undercut by
68. The most common justification for trade secret law is that trade secrets are economically
efficient because they enhance incentives to create. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470, 482-84 (1974); Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 329 (7th Cir. 1984); MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 120-
21 (1986); Bone, supra note 63, at 262; Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets
Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427,435-42 (1995).
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companies who feel compelled to litigate over disclosure of less valuable trade
secrets. The proposed test corrects a market failure and is efficient.
CONCLUSION
Apple alleges that the blogs Apple Insider and Power Page published
particulars about its new product, "Asteroid," before Apple had released any
information about the product. Applying the proposed test, is Asteroid a unique
product? A court would likely find that it is not, becau "several devices
resembling Asteroid have been on the market for some time." 69 Did publishing
the Asteroid information lead to minor or severe economic damage for the
company? There are strong arguments that the economic damage was minor.
First, the Asteroid information was not meant to be a secret forever, but only
for another month or two before Apple announced its release, so there was not
enough time for a competitor to develop a competing product. Also, it seems as
though the bloggers' release of some information regarding Asteroid did not
quash but rather built anticipation for the product. If Apple was in fact harmed,
the harm was minor rather than severe. If this new test were applied, it seems as
though the bloggers in Apple Computer would be able to conceal their sources.
Beyond Apple Computer, the proposed test provides a broad alternative to
courts deciding that bloggers are less worthy of protections than traditional
journalists, a distinction that is both unsupported and undesirable. If courts
determine that bloggers are journalists but otherwise do not change their
approach, the difficulty in weighing trade secret protections against the
journalist's privilege to conceal confidential sources only will become more
apparent because companies increasingly are using trade secrets to protect less
important information. As this Comment contends, the proposed test is ideal
because it both explicitly acknowledges that unique and valuable information
will override First Amendment protections, and it corrects a market
inefficiency related to litigation of non-valuable trade secrets. It is a logical
solution to a legal conundrum.
69. Hiltzik, supra note 17.

